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INTRODUCTION 
It is axiomatic in the international copyright arena for the law to impose 
criminal liability on secondary acts of copyright infringement.  Such acts 
of infringement (which may also attract civil liability) typically entail the 
commercial exploitation of infringing copies of copyright material by 
unlicensed vendors.  Take, for example, the ubiquitous street vendor in 
Bangkok’s hugely-popular Patpong district who, on a daily basis, hawks 
pirated CDs and DVDs to throngs of foreign tourists.  Although street 
scenes such as these are fairly commonplace and representative of the 
livelihoods of numerous other unlicensed vendors the world over, the 
law clearly frowns upon such practices and, for some time now, has 
imposed penal sanctions on these secondary infringers of copyright.1  
The use of the criminal law under such circumstances to aid in the 
effective enforcement of intellectual property rights is understandable, 
because the sale of each unauthorised copy of music, film or software 
will, correspondingly, deprive the relevant copyright owner of the 
economic benefits of a legitimate transaction.  Yet the fact remains that 
many of these so-called copyright pirates have continued to operate 
                                                        
• This chapter was originally published in the European Intellectual Property Review (2007) 
108-114. Permission to reproduce this article has been kindly granted by the authors and 
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, to which the editors are very grateful. 
1 See, generally, Division 5 of Part V of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987; and section 
107 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988. 
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under the present legal environment simply because of high consumer 
demand; there is, after all, a sizeable global market for illegitimate 
products of intellectual property.  The irony, of course, is this: that 
whilst it is a criminal offence to trade in illegitimate copies of copyright 
material, it is – at least under copyright law – not a crime nor an 
actionable civil wrong to purchase or acquire such copies for private and 
domestic use.2 
However, in light of the rapid advancements in computer, digital and 
Internet technologies, consumers and other end-users have begun to 
take things into their own hands.  Instead of purchasing illegitimate 
copies of copyright material from the street vendor, they now discover 
that it is far more efficient and cost-effective to acquire digital copies for 
themselves in the privacy of their own rooms from certain Internet 
websites or through peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks.  They may 
further decide to share these digital copies with others in the Internet or 
P2P file-sharing community.  In the process, however, they inadvertently 
expose themselves to civil action for having committed primary acts of 
copyright infringement, and, in Singapore at least, they may also face 
criminal prosecution if primary infringers like themselves are found 
guilty of wilful infringements of copyright. 
Against this backdrop, the authors will, in this paper, examine the newly-
introduced criminal provisions in Singapore’s copyright legislation which 
target primary acts of copyright infringement and will consider, in 
particular, the consequences of prosecuting offenders pursuant to these 
provisions in the context of a number of hypothetical scenarios 
involving acts of infringement committed on the Internet.  These 
Internet-based scenarios are particularly relevant and timely in the 
present discussion in light of recent reports in the local media 
concerning – (1) the various measures taken by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Singapore (and other local agencies) to encourage all 
companies and businesses to use legal or licensed software in the 
conduct of their day-to-day business; as well as (2) the recent arrest and 
                                                        
2 Note, however, that there is a statutory presumption in section 136(7) of the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987 to this effect: that a person who has in his possession 5 or more 
infringing copies of a work shall, unless the contrary is proved, be presumed to be in 
possession of such copies otherwise than for private and domestic use, or to be in 
possession of such copies for the purpose of sale. 
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prosecution of two individuals in Singapore for allegedly distributing 
unauthorised music files via an Internet chat program.3   This paper 
therefore aims to offer an academic perspective of the various types of 
online activity which, in the authors’ view, will likely attract criminal 
liability under the new provisions (as well as those which ought not to). 
 
CRIMINALIZING PRIMARY COPYRIGHT 
INFRINGEMENT 
One significant consequence of the signing of the United States – 
Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) 4  in May 2003 is the 
introduction, for the very first time in Singapore’s copyright history, of 
criminal provisions targeting primary acts of copyright infringement.  By 
an amendment to the Singapore Copyright Act 1987,5 we now have a 
new section 136(3A), which provision came into force in Singapore on 1 
January 2005.  Therefore, in addition to civil liability, it is also a criminal 
offence in Singapore for primary infringers of copyright to commit wilful 
copyright infringement where the extent of the infringement is significant 
and/or where the infringement is committed to obtain a commercial 
advantage.6  The statute provides that in determining whether the extent 
of the infringement is significant, the court shall have regard to the 
following matters:7 
(a) the volume of any articles that are infringing copies; 
(b)  the value of any articles that are infringing copies; 
                                                        
3 See The Straits Times, 14 January 2006, page 3.  For an update of this story (which will be 
discussed in greater detail below), see The Straits Times, 18 February 2006, page H3. 
4 The US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (USSFTA) is the first free trade agreement to 
be concluded between the US and an Asian country.  See, in particular, Article 16.9.21 of 
the USSFTA and cf. Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement 1994.  The full text of the IP 
Chapter (Chapter 16) of the USSFTA may be viewed online at <http://www.fta.gov.sg>. 
5 See the Copyright (Amendment) Act 2004 (Act No. 52 of 2004) which was passed by 
the Singapore Parliament on 16 November 2004 and which came into force in Singapore 
on 1 January 2005. 
6 See section 136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987.  First-time offenders face up 
to a S$20,000 fine and/or imprisonment of up to six months. 
7 See section 136(6A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
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(c) whether the infringement has a substantial prejudicial impact 
on the owner of the copyright; and 
(d) all other relevant matters. 
Further, a person is deemed by law to have committed an infringement 
for the purpose of obtaining a commercial advantage if the infringing act 
in question was done to obtain a direct advantage, benefit or financial 
gain for a business or trade carried on by him.8 
Before we examine these provisions further and against the backdrop of 
a number of Internet-based hypothetical scenarios, it is appropriate at 
this juncture to briefly outline the various acts of primary infringement 
which are relevant to the discussion in this paper.  There is, first of all, 
the infringing act of reproduction in material form – for example, 
downloading an infringing file from the Internet and subsequently 
saving it in the computer’s hard drive.9  It is also an infringement of the 
copyright in a work to communicate the work to the public. 10   The 
statutory definition of the word “communicate” is “to transmit by 
electronic means (whether over a path, or a combination of paths, 
provided by a material substance or by wireless means or otherwise) a 
work or other subject-matter, whether or not it is sent in response to a 
request, and includes – 
(a) the broadcasting of a work or other subject-matter; 
(b) the inclusion of a work or other subject-matter in a cable 
programme; and 
(c) the making available of a work or other subject-matter (on a 
network or otherwise) in such a way that the work or subject-
                                                        
8 See section 136(6B) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
9 See section 17 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
10 See, for example, section 26(1)(a) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987.  It should be 
noted that the exclusive right to communicate a work to the public is generally available to 
the owners of copyright in authors’ works and in cinematograph films (amongst other 
forms of copyright subject-matter).  Producers of sound recordings, on the other hand, 
enjoy the exclusive right to make available to the public a sound recording by means of, or 
as part of, a digital audio transmission (defined, in section 7(1) of the Singapore Copyright 
Act 1987, as “a transmission of a sound recording, in whole or in part, in a digital or other 
non-analogue form”). 
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matter may be accessed by any person from a place and at a 
time chosen by him”.11 
The statute therefore recognises two distinct forms of communication – 
(1) transmission of a work by electronic means (for example, by 
broadcasting or cable-casting), and (2) making available a work in such a 
way that the work may be accessed by any person from a place and at a 
time chosen by him (in this situation, transmission of a work is said to 
be recipient-initiated).  The former mode of communication is generally 
characteristic of “push” technologies (where there is an active communicator 
with multiple passive recipients), whilst the latter is generally characteristic 
of “pull” technologies (passive communicator with multiple active recipients).  
We shall explore these different forms of communication in greater 
detail below when we examine the (criminal) implications of wilful 
copyright infringement in the online environment.  Suffice it to say, for 
present purposes, that the right of making available a work to the public 
was specifically introduced by Parliament to enable copyright owners to 
control the dissemination of their works on the Internet. 
Let us now turn to an academic analysis of six Internet-based 
hypothetical scenarios. 
 
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN CYBERSPACE – 
WHO ARE THE REAL CULPRITS? 
To what extent is the conduct in each of the following hypothetical 
scenarios a violation of section 136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 
1987? 12   Should the primary copyright infringer in each of these 
examples be subject to criminal prosecution? 
                                                        
11 See section 7(1) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 (emphasis added).  Cf. also Article 
8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996 as well as Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996. 
12 It is not the authors’ intention to deal with issues concerning jurisdiction and 
territoriality in this paper, as the hypothetical examples set out above have been 
formulated on the assumption that criminal proceedings, if any, may appropriately be 
brought before a court of law in Singapore. 
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1. Fly-by-nite (a sole proprietor) runs an online business where, for 
a small fee, members of the Internet community can visit his 
virtual “store” and purchase unauthorised digital copies of the 
latest hit song.13 
2. Techie, the IT manager of a medium-sized dot.com company, 
downloads for a fee an original piece of computer software (e.g. 
Macromedia Flash) and, as instructed by his superiors, makes 
multiple copies of it for the use of all company employees in 
the IT and web-design departments.14 
3. JJ, a private individual, uploads to an Internet host 
server/website a digital copy each of several Hollywood films 
(prior to their official commercial release) for other Internet 
users to download for free. 
4. Digital Philanthropist, a private individual, designates several files 
in his computer’s hard drive as being available for 
sharing/swapping (for free, of course) with other users of a 
P2P file-sharing network. 
5. Chatty, a 25-year-old student, has numerous online “chat mates” 
with whom he ICQs on a daily basis.  Recently, over several 
chat sessions, Chatty forwarded a large number of 
unauthorised MP3 files to all his online pals for their listening 
pleasure. 
6. Touch-me-not, a university undergraduate, habitually downloads 
from the Internet – for his own personal consumption – 
unauthorised copies of music and movie files (each file or 
collection of files corresponding to a distinct song or movie 
                                                        
13 For a recent case from Taiwan, see 
<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/detail.asp?ID=78741&GRP=A> 25 January 2008. 
14 For a real-life example, see the report entitled “Design firm first to face illegal software 
charges” in The Straits Times, 10 March 2006, front page.  According to court papers, 
unauthorised versions of software such as Microsoft Windows and Office, Adobe 
Photoshop and Autodesk AutoCAD (worth an estimated S$50,000) had been installed on 
the firm’s computers in Singapore.  This interior design firm was subsequently fined 
S$30,000 when the case was brought before the District Court: see The Straits Times, 28 
April 2006, page H12.  This case is now reported as PP v PDM International Pte Ltd [2006] 
SGDC 91. 
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title) and now has some 50 Gigabytes (GB) of copyright 
material stored in his computer’s hard drive. 
Virtually Fly-by-nite 
This scenario is fairly straightforward.  By running an online music store, 
Fly-by-nite would have made available to the public (without permission, 
of course) digital copies of the latest hit songs in such a way that allows 
any member of the public to purchase and download these songs from a 
place and at a time chosen by the individual person.  This is clearly in 
breach of the copyright owners’ exclusive right of making available 
(which, as explained above, has been subsumed within the broader 
communication right under Singapore’s copyright legislation). 15   It is 
equally clear that the infringing act in question was committed for the 
purpose of obtaining a commercial advantage. 16   Fly-by-nite’s online 
business is in contravention of section 136(3A) of the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987 and he is therefore liable to criminal prosecution 
thereunder.17 
Techie and Macromedia Flash 
Literary copyright subsists in the Macromedia Flash software program18 
and Techie understands that he has to pay for the downloading of an 
original version from the Macromedia.com website.  Techie and his 
superiors, however, fail to realise that the amount tendered is only good 
for the installation of the program on one computer and that a site 
licence is required for installation on multiple computers within the 
company.  Making multiple copies of a software program (or, indeed, 
the installation of an original program on multiple computers) 
constitutes a clear infringement of the copyright owner’s exclusive right 
of reproduction.19  An offence is committed under section 136(3A) if 
                                                        
15 See the text accompanying note 10 et seq, above. 
16 For the meaning of “commercial advantage”, see the text accompanying note 8, above. 
17 In the alternative, Fly-by-nite may well be prosecuted under the traditional penal 
provisions in copyright law for his role as an online secondary infringer of copyright.  See, 
in this respect, the discussion in the text accompanying note 1, above. 
18 A computer program is protected as a literary work under section 7A(1)(b) of the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
19 See also section 17 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
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these infringing acts were committed for the purpose of obtaining a 
commercial advantage, 20  which clearly is the case in this example.  
Techie and his superiors are therefore likely to be prosecuted (along with 
the company) in light of the evidence that the offence in question had 
been committed with their consent or connivance.21 
JJ – the Gateway to Hollywood 
Whereas the first two examples were crafted in the commercial context, 
we turn now to a discussion of several other Internet-based scenarios of 
a more personal and domestic nature. 
It may surprise JJ that infringements of copyright can occur even in the 
privacy of one’s room at home.  By uploading unauthorised copies of 
movie files to an Internet host server for other users to download for 
free, JJ (like Fly-by-nite in the first example above) has made these files 
available to the public – in a way that allows any member of the public 
to access them from any place and at any time chosen by the individual 
– without first obtaining the requisite consent from the relevant owners 
of copyright.  JJ may have acted with the best of intentions (certainly no 
commercial underpinnings here) and in accordance with the infectious 
spirit of giving and sharing that is very much part of Internet culture.  
Nevertheless, he is a primary infringer of copyright who may now also 
face criminal prosecution under section 136(3A) if the extent of the 
infringement committed is deemed significant. 
As alluded to above, 22  the statute sets out some guidelines to help 
determine whether the extent of the infringement is significant.  We can, 
first of all, consider “the volume of any articles that are infringing 
copies”.  In this hypothetical example, JJ has uploaded a digital copy 
each of several Hollywood films (say 100 of them).  Therefore, there are 
100 infringing copies of movie files hosted on the Internet server and let 
us assume, for the moment, that the number of infringing copies in 
question (here, 100) is indeed significant.  Nevertheless, we are 
compelled to consider, in assessing whether the extent of the 
infringement is significant, the volume of articles that are infringing 
                                                        
20 For the meaning of “commercial advantage”, see the text accompanying note 8, above. 
21 See section 201B(4) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
22 See the main text accompanying note 7, above. 
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copies, and not the volume of infringing copies per se.  Let us briefly 
explore this semantic difference. 
If JJ were to be found in possession of 100 physical copies of pirated 
music CDs, it is arguable (based on our earlier assumption) that he is in 
possession of a significant number of articles that are infringing copies.  
The physical CD itself is an article which contains an infringing copy of 
one or more songs.  What, however, does the word “article” mean in the 
digital context?  The unauthorised movie file found hosted on the 
Internet server is itself an infringing copy, but is it also an “article” that 
contains an infringing copy?  The present authors are of the view that 
the word “article”, as it is used in the statute, suggests some physical 
embodiment of infringing copies of copyright material and that its precise 
meaning in the digital context is somewhat unclear.  We will, in any 
event, revisit the difficulties presented by this first guideline when we 
analyse the final hypothetical scenario below. 
Another important guideline stipulated in the statute concerns an 
enquiry into whether the infringement “has a substantial prejudicial 
impact on the owner of the copyright”.  It is likely that JJ will be 
prosecuted, if at all, on the premise of this factor in particular.  It has 
often been argued (by those in the industry) that making movie files 
available at no cost on the Internet to all and sundry will most certainly 
deprive the relevant owners of copyright of the economic benefits of a 
legitimate transaction, and particularly so when these files were uploaded 
prior to the official commercial release of the movies themselves.  The 
point has also been raised that the impact on the copyright owner is 
particularly damaging in the online environment due to the relative ease 
and pace of infringement.  Employing the force of the criminal law may 
therefore be necessary to weed out such practices.  JJ, the provider of 
free movie files on the Internet, ought to be wary of this! 
Digital Philanthropist 
Like JJ in the example above, Digital Philanthropist (DP) is equally in 
breach of copyright for supporting and engaging in P2P file-sharing 
activity.  It matters not whether the unauthorised digital files are found 
hosted on an Internet server (as in JJ’s case) or are stored in one’s 
computer hard drive as “seed” files for other users of a P2P file-sharing 
network (such as BitTorrent) to download.  In either case, the copyright 
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owner’s exclusive right of making available has been infringed – 
members of the public may access these files from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. 
As to whether DP ought to be prosecuted under the new criminal 
provisions for having committed wilful copyright infringement on a 
significant scale, the analysis will similarly take into account, inter alia, the 
volume of any articles that are infringing copies (query whether this 
refers to the actual number of unauthorised files which DP has 
designated as being available for file-sharing?) as well as the impact of 
the infringement on the relevant owners of copyright. 
Interestingly, there is a recent decision from Hong Kong involving the 
prosecution of a private individual who had engaged in P2P file-sharing 
activity in a non-commercial setting.  In HKSAR v Chan Nai Ming,23 the 
accused person was charged under section 118(1)(f) of the Copyright 
Ordinance (Cap. 528) for distributing or for attempting to distribute 
unauthorised copies of movie files (otherwise than for the purpose of 
any trade or business) to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the 
rights of the copyright owner.  Using the BitTorrent file-sharing 
software, the accused had designated these infringing files (which were 
stored in his computer’s hard drive) as being available for sharing with 
other users of the BitTorrent network and had further advertised the 
existence of such files through Internet newsgroups.  Defence counsel 
sought to argue, quite rightly in our view, that the actions of the accused 
did not at all amount to “distribution” within the meaning of that word 
as it was used in section 118(1)(f); at most, the accused had made available 
the films in question to the public without the permission of the relevant 
owners of copyright.  The learned magistrate was, however, not 
persuaded by these arguments and was firmly of the view that the 
accused had distributed or, at the very least, had attempted to distribute 
the infringing files in question to other BitTorrent users.  Magistrate 
Colin Mackintosh opined thus:24 
His acts were an essential part of the downloading process and were 
continuing throughout the downloading, even if he had not been sitting at 
the computer at all times.  These acts were an integral part of the enterprise 
                                                        
23 [2005] 1469 HKCU 1. 
24 Ibid., at para 33. 
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of downloading the infringing copies to other computers.  This amounted to 
distribution. 
The present authors do not, with respect, share the views of the learned 
magistrate.  There may well be a fine distinction between file-sharing (in 
the P2P sense) and file-distribution, but there ought to be a distinction 
nonetheless.25  A distributor is someone who knows exactly who his 
recipients are and who actively targets each one of them.  A close 
examination of the P2P file-sharing system will reveal that the 
transmission of an unauthorised file from the seeder computer (the 
computer on which the file was originally made available to the public) 
to another (end-user’s) computer is clearly initiated by the (unknown) 
recipient himself, albeit with the kind assistance of the seeder (whose 
computer must remain connected to the Internet throughout the 
transmission/downloading process).  It is apparent that the person 
behind the seeder computer – beyond making the file available for 
sharing and keeping the computer connected to the Internet – has no 
further role to play (nor any further need to actively intervene) in the 
downloading process.  He is certainly not a distributor of infringing 
material.  The fact that he advertises the existence of such material 
through Internet newsgroups and helps facilitate the downloading 
process that is initiated by other network users simply does not make 
him a distributor of copyright-infringing material. 26   It must be 
emphasised, once again, that the actual transmission of an infringing file 
on a P2P file-sharing network is clearly recipient-initiated.  Accordingly, the 
person behind the seeder computer (the accused in this case) is, at most, 
guilty of having made available to the public the infringing files in question 
without proper authorisation. 
Be that as it may, one can readily appreciate why the learned magistrate 
in the Chan Nai Ming case came to the conclusion that he did and why 
the position in Singapore – were the accused to be tried in Singapore 
instead – could well be different.  The Copyright Ordinance of Hong 
Kong (Cap. 528) does not contain a provision that is equivalent to 
                                                        
25 See also, in this respect, our discussion of the fifth hypothetical scenario below. 
26 Indeed, the conduct of the accused in this case is clear evidence of his having 
authorised the primary infringement of other BitTorrent users in the downloading 
process.  Such conduct, however, cannot amount to “distribution” – in the ordinary sense 
of the word – on the part of the accused. 
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section 136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987.  Under Hong 
Kong’s copyright laws, the making available to the public of copyright 
works without prior approval is an actionable wrong that only attracts 
civil liability.27  In contrast, the same act, if committed in Singapore, may 
well attract criminal liability if the extent of the infringement committed 
(in a non-commercial context) is deemed significant.  We have, of 
course, already discussed the legal implications of this in relation to JJ 
and DP in the hypothetical examples above. 
We are further fortified in our views by a more recent English decision 
involving an application for summary judgment.  In Polydor Limited v 
Brown, 28  Justice Lawrence Collins took the view that the act of 
connecting a computer (on which unauthorised music files were stored 
in a shared directory) to the Internet for P2P file-sharing purposes fell 
squarely within the types of activity prohibited by sections 16(1)(d) and 
20 of the UK CDPA 1988 – namely the making available to the public of 
copyright works by electronic transmission in such a way that members 
of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them.  It is therefore submitted that if the accused 
in Chan Nai Ming were to be tried in a court of law in Singapore, the 
prosecution will very likely press charges against him pursuant to section 
136(3A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987.29 
Chatty and the ICQ Craze 
The ability to communicate with people from all over the world over the 
Internet and in the comfort of one’s own room has made ICQ (short for 
“I Seek You”) such a success amongst the younger generation.  Online 
                                                        
27 See sections 22(1)(d) and 26 of the Hong Kong Copyright Ordinance (Cap. 528). 
28 [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch). 
29 It may, however, interest the reader to know that the District Court of Paris (Tribunal de 
Grande Instance de Paris) recently ruled in favour of a private individual who had been 
hauled to court by a French recording industry organisation (Société Civile des 
Producteurs Phonographiques) for having uploaded and downloaded 1,212 music files 
using the Kazaa file-sharing software as well as for having in his computer hard drive 
1,875 unauthorised digital files.  The copyright infringer in this case was let off on account 
of the non-commercial nature of his actions – the defendant had downloaded these 
infringing files for his private and personal use.  This case is reported at 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/02/08/france_legalises_p2p/> 25 January 2008 
and at <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20060207-6135.html> 25 January 2008. 
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chat-rooms are perpetually cluttered with droves of registered users who 
keep in touch with one another through instant messaging.  Chatty in 
our present example is but one ardent supporter of the ICQ 
phenomenon.  Yet, in what appears to be an innocuous act of simply 
chatting with other like-minded people, Chatty does not realise that he 
cannot, additionally, forward or transmit to all his online friends 
copyright-protected MP3 files without first seeking approval.  Sending 
file attachments (electronically) to other ICQ users in the course of a 
chat session constitutes a clear infringement of the copyright owners’ 
exclusive right of communication.30  Therefore, if the infringement is 
wilful and the extent of which is deemed significant,31 Chatty may also 
be subject to criminal prosecution under section 136(3A) of the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987.  Alternatively, Chatty may be charged 
under the other (long-standing) provisions in section 136 of the Act – 
which prohibit secondary acts of copyright infringement generally and 
which also carry heavier penalties – if the prosecution takes the view that 
his act of distributing infringing MP3 files to other ICQ users for non-
trade/profit purposes was to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the 
relevant owner(s) of copyright.32 
Download Junky Touch-me-not 
The copyright owners’ exclusive right of reproduction in material form 
is clearly infringed when Touch-me-not downloads (without 
authorisation) digital files from the Internet and stores them in his 
computer’s hard drive.33  An action for infringement can, of course, be 
                                                        
30 As alluded to earlier, one form of communication that is contemplated under the 
Singapore Copyright Act 1987 is the transmission of a work by electronic means – see, in 
this respect, the text accompanying note 11 et seq, above. 
31 The act of transmitting a large number of unauthorised MP3 files to numerous other 
ICQ users will, arguably, have a substantial prejudicial impact on the owner(s) of 
copyright: see section 136(6A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 as well as the text 
accompanying note 7, above. 
32 See, for example, sections 136(2)(b) and 136(3) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987; 
and cf. section 107(1)(e) of the UK CDPA 1988.  See also The Straits Times, 18 February 
2006, page H3, where it was reported that two men had, for the first time in Singapore’s 
copyright history, been sentenced to jail (for 3 and 4 months, respectively) for having 
illegally distributed (in a non-trade/profit context) hundreds of pirated MP3 files via a 
privately-operated Internet chat program. 
33 See section 17 of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987. 
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brought against him by the relevant owners of copyright. 34   Is he, 
however, also criminally liable under section 136(3A) of the Singapore 
Copyright Act 1987 for wilful copyright infringement on a significant 
scale?  In this instance, Touch-me-not has downloaded an array of music 
and movie files for his own personal enjoyment.  He is not, by any 
means, a copyright pirate – one who deals in infringing copies of 
copyright material on a commercial scale.  Nevertheless, if the extent of 
his infringement is deemed significant (albeit non-commercial in nature), 
he may still be subject to prosecution under the new criminal provisions 
of the Copyright Act.  What, then, is the meaning of “significant” in this 
context? 
If the domestic end-user is an occasional downloader who only has a 
handful of digital files stored in his computer’s hard drive, he is unlikely 
to be prosecuted under the law.  However, we are here faced with a 
compulsive downloader who has downloaded some 50 GB of copyright 
material.  At first blush, the extent of Touch-me-not’s infringement 
appears “significant”.  Regard, however, must be had to the list of 
factors contained in section 136(6A) of the Singapore Copyright Act 
1987,35 to which our discussion now turns. 
 
The first factor concerns “the volume of any articles that are infringing 
copies”.  We observe right at the outset that our assessment of this first 
factor is concerned only with the volume of articles that are infringing 
copies, and not with the volume of infringing copies per se.  This 
interpretation clearly accords with a plain reading of the provision.  In 
the instant example, Touch-me-not has illegally downloaded some 50 
GB of files to his computer’s hard drive.  Each music/movie file 
downloaded by him is clearly an infringing copy, such that in aggregate, 
the volume of infringing copies found stored in his computer’s hard 
drive is arguably significant.  But is each music/movie file also to be 
                                                        
34 Indeed, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently decided that the act 
of downloading (30) copyrighted songs from the Kazaa file-sharing network (even if for 
the purposes of music sampling) clearly amounted to copyright infringement and could 
not be defended on the ground of fair use: see BMG Music v Gonzalez, Case No. 05-1314 
(7th Cir, 2005). 
35 See the text accompanying note 7, above. 
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treated as an “article” that is an infringing copy of the underlying work 
or subject-matter in question?  We think not. 
If a comparison is made of the statutory language used in this first factor 
with that used in the other section 136 provisions (i.e. provisions which 
generally prohibit secondary acts of copyright infringement),36 it appears 
to us that Parliament had intended the word “article” (as used in all these 
provisions) to refer to the physical medium in which the infringing copy 
resides.  In other words, a pirated CD-ROM, for example, is an “article” 
that contains one or more infringing copies of copyright material.  
Insofar as downloaded music/movie files are concerned, whilst the 
music/movie files themselves are infringing copies, the “article” which 
contains all these infringing copies must, at least on one interpretation, 
refer to Touch-me-not’s computer hard drive. 
Therefore, if we were to apply the foregoing interpretation of this first 
factor to the instant example, it will be quite untenable to argue that the 
extent of Touch-me-not’s infringement is significant.  Whilst it is true 
that Touch-me-not is now in possession of a sizeable volume of 
infringing copies, we are reminded, once again, that it is not the volume 
of infringing copies per se that is relevant to the enquiry.  Instead, an 
argument may well be made that Touch-me-not is merely in possession 
of a single article (here, the computer hard drive) which contains an 
infringing digital copy each of numerous (and distinct) copyright works 
or subject-matter. 
The question, of course, remains as to whether Parliament had truly 
intended to criminalize the act of Internet downloading in the domestic 
context based simply on the evidence of the sheer number of infringing 
files possessed by the accused.  In the absence of clear and unambiguous 
language to this effect in the statute,37 the present authors are of the 
                                                        
36 See, for example, sections 136(1), (2) and (3) of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987.  See 
also the definition of an “infringing copy” in section 7(1) of the Singapore Copyright Act 
1987 – essentially, an infringing copy, in relation to a work, means “a reproduction of the 
work…, being an article the making of which constituted an infringement of the 
copyright in the work…”. 
37 Contrast, in this respect, the statutory language employed in the Australian Copyright 
Act 1968 where it is clearly defined in section 132AA that the word “article” (as used in 
the provisions which set out the various copyright offences) includes “a reproduction or 
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view that any lingering uncertainty over the precise interpretation and 
scope of this first factor (particularly in the digital context) ought to be 
resolved in favour of the accused person. 
Before leaving the discussion on this subject, we would like to clarify 
that the following issues stemming from the statutory language 
employed in the newly-introduced provisions remain unresolved and 
that a detailed discussion of these issues would have to be dealt with by 
the authors elsewhere: 
(1) The meaning of “wilful” copyright infringement; 
(2) To what extent would the infringing activity discussed in the 
final scenario above constitute a “substantial prejudicial impact” 
on the copyright owner; 
(3) Whether the defence of fair dealing is available to an accused 
person charged under section 136(3A). 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have introduced to the reader the relevant provisions 
of the Singapore Copyright Act 1987 which aim, for the first time in 
Singapore’s copyright history, to criminalize primary acts of copyright 
infringement.  In view of the infancy of these provisions, it is as yet 
unclear what their prosecutorial reach will be.  In this regard, we have 
tested the scope of section 136(3A), which of course is the principal 
provision, against a number of Internet-based hypothetical scenarios 
which represent the sorts of activity typically undertaken by those in the 
online community. 
Who, then, are the likely copyright offenders in the online environment?  
Our analysis, in sum, reveals that individuals (or entities operated by 
them) who commit primary acts of copyright infringement in the course 
of a business/trade and obtain a commercial advantage in the process 
are likely to be prosecuted under section 136(3A).  Moving away from 
                                                                                                                  
copy of a work or other subject-matter, being a reproduction or copy in electronic form” 
(emphasis added). 
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the commercial context, it becomes more difficult, in our view, to justify 
criminalizing primary acts of copyright infringement unless it can be 
shown that the actions of the alleged infringers have had a substantial 
prejudicial impact on the relevant owners of copyright (where, in other 
words, the resulting harm to the copyright owner is real, tangible and 
significant).  We have identified some types of online behaviour which 
may fall into this category and therefore attract criminal liability under 
section 136(3A) – e.g. where the private individual makes available to the 
public a large number of unauthorised files on an Internet host server or 
through a P2P file-sharing network, or where the alleged offender 
distributes such material to other online users via email, Internet chat 
programs and the like.  We are, however, of the view that prosecutorial 
discretion under section 136(3A) ought to be exercised even more 
judiciously when the target in question is an individual downloader of 
unauthorised content in the private and domestic context.  It is 
submitted that there is arguably some inherent uncertainty over the 
interpretation and application of the statutory guidelines in section 
136(6A) which may militate against a section 136(3A) prosecution under 
such circumstances. 
We must not forget that the relationship between the creators of 
intellectual property on the one hand and the consumers of intellectual 
property on the other is a delicate and symbiotic one.  Each group of 
people simply cannot do without the other – just as consumers look 
forward to new and exciting content, the owners of copyright equally 
need strong consumer support (financial or otherwise). 38   Consumer 
confidence and trust will be eroded if consumers continue to be sued by 
the industry and prosecuted by the state for, inter alia, private and 
domestic acts of copyright infringement.  We do not, of course, endorse 
                                                        
38 Interestingly, in a study recently conducted by Pollara Inc. and commissioned by the 
Canadian Recording Industry Association, it was discovered that most consumers had 
acquired music on their computers through legitimate sources and that approximately 
75% of those who obtained music through P2P file-sharing services subsequently 
purchased the music (having used the various P2P channels as a means of sampling music 
prior to purchase).  The report also carried this message: “… the Pollara study does make 
a strong case that the recording industry is in real trouble, if people don’t like what they’re 
being offered, don’t like the way it is priced, and can’t find places in which to buy it.  That 
suggests a business model in severe need of evolution – or even intelligent design”.  See 
<http://www.stereophile.com/news/032006cria/index.html> 25 January 2008. 
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such acts of infringement.  Perhaps there is now a heightened need for 
further education and long-term persuasion in this respect.  If, however, 
the relevant industry players – which have been perceived by many to be 
greedy conglomerates that only think of short-changing their customers 
– do not get their acts together quickly and endeavour to satisfy the 
changing needs of today’s consumers (by, for example, employing new 
business models and offering attractive and affordable alternative 
platforms for entertainment consumption),39 then this will only lead to 
greater consumer cynicism and disregard, as well as a return to the 
perennial problem of copyright piracy of an even higher order.  Surely, 
we can all look forward to a better and brighter future. 
 
                                                        
39 Thankfully, there have been some positive developments in this area.  For example, 
Warner Brothers recently struck a landmark distribution deal with BitTorrent (the 
infamous provider of P2P file-sharing software) which will, in due course, result in the 
use of the BitTorrent technology to distribute movies and television shows over the 
Internet: see <http://news.com.com/2100-1026_3-6070004.html> 25 January 2008 and 
<http://news.com.com/2100-1025_3-6092296.html> 25 January 2008.  Note also the 
recent announcements by Universal Music Group and EMI Group that they will soon 
offer their catalogues of recordings and music videos for free downloading on an 
advertisement-supported website: see 
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/15452661.htm> 25 
January 2008. 
